Are Anglo-American-Style Normative Planning Theories Applicable in South Asian Cities?
An Exploratory Study

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Three types of normative planning theories have been popular among planners in the United State and Western Europe in recent years, with a fourth knocking at the door. In contrast, rational planners in South Asian cities, realizing that their resources are limited, have traditionally practised a synoptic approach to planning. Unfortunately, most of their planning initiatives have been futile, owing to the poverty of this region. This has led planners and policy makers to search for appropriate and innovative alternatives for planning in this region. This paper analyzes and explores the applicability of Anglo-American-style normative planning theories in the cities of South Asia. The author concludes that implementing Western-style planning theories in general, and normative planning theories in particular, is premature, because an appropriate milieu does not yet exist in South Asian cities at their present stage of development.

Key words: normative planning, South Asian cities, civil society, urban governance

Introduction

The common factors in South Asian countries include a large proportion of the population living below the poverty line, a huge influx of people from...
rural to urban areas, the rapid spread of slums in cities, unhygienic sanitation systems, polluted water, lack of electricity, lack of infrastructure, lack of doctors and nurses, spread of AIDS, a politically divided civil society, and lack of resources (Majumder et al. 1996). These countries, like other developing countries of the world, are characterized by a greater degree of inequality in resource management than is found in developed countries. In some of these nations, the roots of poverty and inequality in resource distribution lie in inherent socio-cultural factors that are consequences of colonization (Rondinelli 1993). In the past, most countries in this region adopted a synoptic approach to planning, driven by a rational realization that their resources are limited. John D. Clark (1991) argues that many of these planning efforts were abandoned, and few of them have been completed (Rondinelli et al. 1988). To achieve targeted growth rates, the governments of South Asian countries make pragmatic national development plans for each sectoral activity, conceived as long-term plans, mid-term plans, and short-term plans. In contrast, Anglo-American style planning theories have rarely been applied in this region.

Although there is a rich planning literature on theoretical perspectives and their application to normative planning in the United States and Western Europe, there are lacunae in the literature on the suitability and practice of such approaches in Third World countries. Therefore, there is a great need for research on the applicability and usefulness of Anglo-American-style planning theories, especially normative planning theories, in such countries. Watson (2002) broke the impasse with her seminal article on the usefulness of normative planning in sub-Saharan Africa. The present article follows up on Watson’s analysis; however, I sketch the reality of another troublesome region on the globe and portray the fitness and practice of normative planning in a different milieu—South Asia, home to one-sixth of the population of the globe.

I acknowledge that application of planning theories is as important in rural areas of South Asia as in urban areas. I also believe that urban system networks do not work independently from rural linkages and that the urban–rural relationship has great influence on the types of planning and the ways in which they are practised in South Asia. The dominant presence of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in rural areas, the presence of rural government representatives, and the roles of local elites in local planning suggest that the applicability of normative planning in rural areas of this region merits investigation.

However, I limit my investigations to city areas, with specific explanation of rural areas as necessary. More specifically, I portray current scenarios in large cities of the region and inquire into the milieu for practice of normative views of planning that have been part of the planning jargon in the West for the past two decades. I have chosen large cities over rural areas because
most rural areas in this region have no formal planning authority, although there may be local governments that are assigned certain responsibilities but do not have authority to plan for their jurisdictions (Islam et al. 1994; Islam and Islam 1994). Rarely has any administrative entity hitherto practised independent, bottom-up planning; an exception is the Indian province of Kerala (Chettiparamb 2006). On the other hand, the planning departments in large South Asian cities typically enjoy authority to prepare and implement plans for their respective jurisdictions.

Understanding “planning” merits elucidation and elaboration of the scope in which I examine the application of normative views of planning in this article. Nowadays the term “planning” is used in a broad sense that includes economic, social, environmental, and cultural aspects, among others. In this broad sense, people with variety of backgrounds from different schools of thoughts are involved in the process, a significant portion of whom do not have formal planning degrees. For the purposes of this study, I use the term “planning” from a South Asian perspective, recognizing that people with no planning background may be performing planning tasks. By “planning,” I mean any dedicated actions been performed by the “designated” people, representing government authorities in general and the city authorities in particular. Nonetheless, I do not discount the importance of other professionals who are indirectly involved in the planning process of a city by creating pressure on planners within their plausible scopes. For example, the role of civil society is gaining increasing importance in planning in South Asian cities. I analyze such roles of pressure groups in the appropriate sections below.

The article is organized as follows. First, I present a brief review of the contemporary state of normative planning theories that could have relevance to South Asian cities. This is followed by a brief presentation of urban governance and planning practices in South Asia. I then elaborate the current socio-political and economic situation and elucidate the roles played by civil society in South Asian cities. Finally, I offer an assessment of the applicability and practice of normative views of planning in the region, followed by concluding remarks.

**Normative Planning: A Brief Review**

Andreas Faludi (1973) defines normative planning as a type of planning whose objectives and goals are themselves, in turn, the objects of rational choices. However, the most widely used definition of normative planning was coined by John Friedmann (1987, 1996), who suggested that in a social system, normative planning is primarily concerned with the ends of action. Friedmann further suggests that the goals of normative planning are same as those of the social system in which normative planning is to be implemented.
The investigation of normative planning is extended to the ends instead of limiting itself to the means.

Normative planning helps one to make choices about ends while being aware of existing knowledge (Watson 2002). Often the ends of actions are designed by politics rather than by planning. Normative guidance in planning is not new, however. Several authors (Howe and Kauffman 1979; Beatley 1984, 1991; Wachs 1985; Howe 1990, 1994) have articulated their thoughts on normative values in planning. Louis Albrechts (2006) postulates that normative planning should be used to frame an actor- and space-oriented picture for the planner and should be executed in a fair and respectful manner. He presents five normative viewpoint characteristics: selective planning, relational-annex-inclusive planning, integrative planning, visioning, and action-oriented planning. Geraint Ellis (2004) states that normative principles are considered important in planning processes when issues relating to third-party rights arise, while Bickerstaff and Walker (2001) discuss public involvement in planning processes, citing participation experiences and developments originating in transport planning.

Tore Sager (2001) presents four strands of positive planning theory: zoning, the success or failure of planning, differences in implementation and the results of planning between entities, and differences in planning styles and their uses. He advocates heightened public participation in planning processes, but contends that their involvement should not be limited to one planning theory or practice. Michael Neuman (2005) addresses four primary concerns within city planning theories: explanation, prediction, justification, and normative guidelines. Central to Neuman’s theme is planners’ attention to retaining “urban” approaches in city planning theory. He argues that normative planning, combined with urban theories, has suffered from and is limited by “unitary or pluralist conceptions of the good” (2005, 136).

While some planners focus on what constitutes a good or bad urban strategy, Gunder and Hillier (2007) challenge the normative perspectives of strategic urban planning. They hold that normative perspectives help to define whether a city is healthy, stating that while the envisioning of utopia is a productive force, normative planning elements should also embrace the goal of making reality better.

I focus here on four views of normative planning: the communicative approach (Healey 1997, 1999; Innes 1995; Forester 1989); the Just City approach (Fainstein 1995, 2000); the multicultural approach (Sandercock 1998a, 1998b, 2000); and the Lacanian approach (Hillier and Gunder 2003; Gunder and Hillier 2004). Since the Lacanian approach to planning literature and application is as yet inchoate, I focus mostly on the first three approaches. These concepts are reviewed briefly below. While my review is brief and not all-inclusive, I emphasize those aspects that I envision as suitable for a South Asian context.
The *communicative planning approach* is largely influenced, first, by the works of the philosopher Jürgen Habermas (1990a, 1990b), reputed “father” of the German school of critical theory of planning. Habermas proposed the idea that the public realm should be reconstituted through open and public conversation and debate. Second, the communicative planning approach is influenced by John Dewey and Richard Rorty’s notions of American pragmatism. Like Habermas, other advocates of this approach postulate that communication itself is the principal part of the practice of planning (Forester 1989). This approach inverts the traditional “top-down” and “expert-driven” planning process (Healey 1997). Communicative planning theorists believe in the positive roles played by civil society. Patsy Healey (1999, 114) argues that communicative planners should strive for shared understanding, mutual trust, and “identification,” which are built up and linger as new “cultural resources” or “cultural capital” within sense-making frameworks. The communicative planning approach focuses on regional-level governments (both sub-national and local) and on individual human beings—as citizens, as planners, or as politicians. Healey (1999) argues that inter-subjective efforts toward mutual understanding lead to a new concept of reasoning, which emphasizes how planning practices enable solutions to be discovered communicatively.

Equity, justice, distribution, and redistribution are the norms of the *Just City approach*—richly informed by Susan Fainstein (2000). David Harvey (2000) has also applied the Just City approach, with local governments and agencies as the units of analysis. However, Fainstein’s Just City approach is especially relevant to South Asian context and merits brief elaboration. Advocates of the Just City approach are influenced by neo-liberal development theories and post-Marxist political economy. In Fainstein’s (2000) vision, society is composed of groups instead of classes or ethnicities. She argues that these groups can benefit from the distributive planning processes. Like theorists of the communicative planning approach, Fainstein is also concerned with people’s participation in the planning process, but hers is a different perspective. Fainstein defines “planners” as autonomous or independent, which is different from the communicative planning approach’s definitions of “government planners.”

Fainstein (2000) argues that different spatial forms have different impacts on the economic growth and environmental sustainability of a city or state. However, ambiguity persists in her approach: she insists on a planning model in which the government has the smallest possible role and defers to a capitalist economic system. She also promotes a state or nation that is entrepreneurial and welfare oriented. Fainstein (2000) fails to clarify, however, how resources should be distributed in a Just City, if there is minimal government intervention in the planning process (Watson 2002). Fainstein’s (2000) best example of the Just City is Amsterdam, where spatial diversity and varied neighbourhoods are accompanied by a state system characterized by a welfare
philosophy, a powerful civil society, and public ownership of land.

The multicultural approach in normative planning is influenced by cultural studies and postmodernism, and has its roots in advocacy planning. Theorists of communicative planning and the multicultural approach have in common an endeavour to shift the emphasis in planning from consequences to consciousness, and from end results to process (Beauregard 1998; Neuman 2000). Leonie Sandercock contends that civil society acts as an autonomous body to bargain with the government and as a catalyst for societal change. She views society as a system consisting of different groups based on race, gender, and ethnicity (Sandercock 1998a, 2000).

Identity is another aspect that Sandercock considers an important factor for democratic societies. She rules out the notion of universal citizenship claimed by communicative planners, arguing instead for the primacy of various groups who are different in culture and identity. She argues that cities, societies, and states should practise the politics of many, that is, democracy as a “politics of difference” (Sandercock 1998a, 1998b, 2000). Sandercock trusts in the “local knowledge” of people, in contrast to the “expert knowledge” of Healey (1999).

Recent pedagogical developments in planning theory are characterized by a trend toward importing the Lacanian psychoanalytic paradigm (Allmendinger and Gunder 2005; Hillier and Gunder 2003; Gunder and Hillier 2004; Gunder 2005). While these writers invoke similar Lacanian themes, they vary in their discussions of particular planning issues. While Allmendinger and Gunder (2005) address the role of planners, agencies, processes, and other actors in the administrative framework by incorporating Lacanian perspectives as they relate to issues in modern planning, Hillier and Gunder (2003) and Gunder and Hillier (2004) take a “developmental assessment” approach to their analysis of planning theory. Gunder and Hillier argue that because “Lacan conceptualized many of his psychological ideas spatially” (2004, 229), his writings are relevant and applicable to understanding the processes of planning decision making and development assessment. They attempt to take planning theory beyond its current status to apply Lacanian approaches in search of a better understanding of “actor behaviours in strategic and statutory planning” (219). Finally, Gunder (2005) cites Jacques Lacan’s and Henri Lefebvre’s Freudian-inspired insights into the abstract and symbolic world of “the desired and wanted” realities of planning. He draws on Lacan’s concept of “jouissance” to help explain public wants vis-à-vis global capitalism’s powerful actors as they attempt to negotiate a path to a utopian society.

Urban Governance and Planning Practices in South Asia

In South Asia, attempts have been made to define and redefine the role of the
state and of planning agencies, mostly as a response to donor insistence and international pressure. The attrition of state agencies’ power in South Asian countries has been the result of a number of factors, including glaring inefficiencies and massive corruption by civil servants at all levels, falling revenue, and the adoption of structural adjustment programs (Task Force on Government Malpractices 1991, 400). These factors have precipitated increased demand for downsizing national and state government activities and operations by reducing manpower for efficient, effective, and timely services. Despite the wisdom behind such demands for small but efficient government at national and state levels, South Asian countries continue to have inefficient surfeits of manpower. This unsustainable economic strategy has been adopted by governments throughout the region to help youth of the governing political party to find employment and thus to reduce the unemployment rate, at least marginally (Salahuddin 1992).

Local and city governments in this region enjoy very limited power, authority, and resources, which forces them to function within a limited scope. The primary reason for this limitation is the dominance of top-down planning practices. This heavy-handed approach has for many years been the major obstacle to the introduction of democratic norms of planning practices, and reflects the lack of popular participation in the planning process, which instead involves only a few officials with little or no formal training in contemporary planning issues and practices. Often the planning process, and thereby its outcomes, is politically motivated: an influential local leader within the governing party or a powerful business leader defines the scope of development projects. In the recent past, however, there have been signs of more flexibility in conceptualizing and applying planning within the region.

The passage of India’s Constitutional Amendment Act (CAA) in 1992 opened the door for bottom-up planning practices to replace the top-down approach, although this has occurred sporadically—for example, in the state of Kerala (Chettiparamb 2006). However, there remain gaps between Kerala and the rest of India and South Asia generally. Kerala is by far the leading state in most aspects of modernizing social and economic life in India. Kerala is not representative of other Indian states, or of other South Asian countries. Therefore, although planning has become democratic and pluralistic in Kerala recently, this is not so in the rest of the region.

In general, South Asia has concentrated on physical planning for years, ignoring social, environmental, and cultural aspects of planning issues. Depending on the sizes and types of governments, South Asian countries exhibit both single-tier and multi-tier planning structures. In countries, such as India and Pakistan, that consist of several states or provinces, planning is administered by both central and provincial governments. In contrast, in Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bhutan, and Maldives, planning takes place under unitary national government system. Irrespective of the national
government system, South Asian countries generally have more than one level of government. For example, Bangladesh has national, district, upazila, and union parishad levels of government. However, often the plans made by planners at any level of government are not implemented; in other words the plans are “on paper only.” Such plans are initiated sometimes to borrow foreign funds, sometimes with honest goals (although these are not implemented due to lack of funds), and sometimes merely as a result of political leaders’ self-interest. The end result is that the plans do not usually materialize, and the planning bodies are therefore considered inefficient and impotent. Nonetheless, city governments are still capable of providing basic services to a portion of city dwellers, despite the ubiquitous visibility of frequent power shutdowns, insufficient water supply, insufficient sewerage facilities, and inadequate garbage-disposal facilities. It is worth mentioning here that about 30% of city dwellers live in bastees and usually receive no urban services from city governments (Dutt and Pomeroy 2008).

Although there are many actors involved in the planning processes in South Asian cities, a generalized picture emerges. First, there is a growing realization among government officials and leaders that they cannot provide basic urban services to all residents, despite the large number of ministries and government bodies directly or indirectly involved in urban affairs (Khan 1994; Mathur 2000). These governments and city authorities are involved only in such areas as administration, resource mobilization, physical planning, land-use management, and water and sanitation. Although sectors such as housing, environmental management, and poverty alleviation are also among the main concerns of these government bodies, they have less direct role in these sectors. Second, national and state/provincial (in case of India and Pakistan) governments are assisted by local governments in areas such as road maintenance, education, primary health care, and waste disposal. Third, there has been increasing formal and informal participation by private organizations in the management of urban services. In formal sectors, these private agencies have been contributing in areas such as housing, public transportation systems, garment and other industries, education, and business and commerce. However, the typical beneficiaries of services provided by formal private organizations are wealthy and middle-income populations. By contrast, the existence of private organizations in the informal sector has promoted transportation systems such as rickshaw and small cottage industries. Fourth, community-based organizations (CBOs) have arisen in large cities. For example, in New Delhi, Bombay, Karachi, and Dhaka, community-based police forces patrol different parts of the city at night. There are also community-based health clinics and hospitals. However, the proportions of citizens covered by such CBOs are still low. Finally, there is a growing number of NGOs serving needy people; however, their role in urban areas is still abysmal compared to their contribution in rural areas. The NGOs princi-
pally provide services to bastee residents in such sectors as potable water, primary health care, family planning, adult education, and sanitation.

From a South Asian perspective, the roles of NGOs and CBOs are extremely important. These organizations have worked as subsidiary actors and agencies in different aspects of urban life where national, provincial, and local/city governments are incapable of providing, or too inefficient to provide, basic services. In other words, NGOs and CBOs have emerged, and their number and the scope of their functions have increased, in South Asian cities because of the absence of local government initiatives where the NGOs and CBOs are more efficient and effective in providing services. Thus, one can presume that different types of non-governmental agencies are informally involved at different levels in the planning process, working parallel to formal government bodies. These non-governmental agencies work as pressure groups, as parts of a civil society.

**Current Socio-political and Economic Situation in South Asia**

The socio-political scenario in South Asia is substantially different from those in the United States and Western Europe. In South Asia, a substantial proportion of people live below the poverty line. A huge influx of people from rural to urban areas is a common phenomenon in this region. Bastees are scattered in different parts of cities; unhygienic sanitation systems, polluted water, lack of electricity, and lack of infrastructure, coupled with poverty, are the common features of bastees (Majumder et al. 1996). Although some bastee residents are involved in the informal economic sector, such as light industries and services (e.g., garment and rickshaw pulling), the bastees in big cities have become safe shelters for urban criminals. Police collect bribes from criminals on a regular basis in preference to arresting them. The insufficient infrastructure, including poor road conditions and insufficient public transportation services, are other dark facets of urban problems in these large cities.

The economic crisis in South Asian countries is severe, with some exceptions. For example, Nepal’s gross domestic product (GDP) per capita was estimated at US$1 100 in 2008 (CIA 2009b), and not only Nepal but other countries of the region rank at the bottom of the ladder of economic development. The estimated GDP per capita of Bangladesh was only US$1 500 in 2008 (CIA 2009a), while Pakistan’s was around US$2 600 (CIA 2009c). The situation is even worse if one investigates the distribution of resources. A minuscule percentage of people control a major share of wealth, while about 30% of city dwellers live in bastees. About one-half of the region’s population lives below the subsistence level (Dutt and Pomeroy 2008). Although India and Pakistan are nuclear powers, they are powerless in alleviating poverty. Indian cities such as the much-discussed Bangalore and Mumbai have grown fast in last decade by embracing business in the information
technology sector, but the vast majority of Indian people remain untouched by it. Particularly worth mentioning is the situation in eastern India, where a substantial proportion of people live from hand to mouth. The political turmoil caused by groups seeking independence from India has caused instability in this part of India.

The condition of the health sector is extremely poor in South Asian cities. Lack of doctors and nurses, along with scarcity of medicines, is commonplace in government hospitals. The scarcity of medicines is due not only to governments’ inability to supply them but also to massive corruption by health practitioners, who sell government-supplied medical supplies on the black market to earn illegal money. Bastee residents can hardly get appropriate treatment unless they are helped by charitable organizations or philanthropists. Various fatal diseases are prevalent in the bastees. The increasing spread of AIDS in large South Asian cities accentuates the region’s poor health system; for example, India ranks highest in the world in terms of numbers infected with AIDS.

South Asia has persistently been a region of political instability in the past. New forms of violence and terrorism are shaping the political arena. Bomb blasts in public places and killings of innocents are becoming a trite phenomenon of urban life. It is popularly believed that politicians sponsor criminal groups, who act as their musclemen and vote collectors during elections. Most South Asian countries, with the exceptions of India and Sri Lanka, cannot practise democracy on an ongoing basis. Although these two countries also have political issues, including independence movements in Kashmir and seven eastern states (the “seven sisters”\(^8\)) in India and by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka, their armed forces have shied away from assuming state power. In Pakistan and Bangladesh, by contrast, the armed forces have commanded state power time and again since independence. Nepal and Bhutan had traditional kingships, but have recently abandoned them. The example of Bhutan’s first ever general election and the abolition of kingship in Nepal, both of which took place in 2008, are worth mentioning here. The tiny island state of Maldives was governed by the same president for years, until he lost the country’s first ever general election in 2008. Although Bangladesh, Nepal, and Pakistan have enjoyed democratically elected governments intermittently in the past decade, their elections have also been characterized as shams on many occasions.

The rise of extremist political powers and the use of religion by so-called democratic political parties are also major problems in South Asian politics. India’s rule by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the Indian People’s Party that sponsors Hindu fundamentalisms, for eight years and the reign of one coalition party (Jamat-E-Islam) in Bangladesh in the recent past are two such examples. The misuse of power by ruling parties has become an alarming phenomenon in the region. The demolition of the historical Babri Mosque\(^9\) in
Ayodhya, India, by the Hindu fundamental party Bisheshwar Hindu Parishad (BHP, or World Hindu Union) and its allies on 6 December 1992 is a dramatic example of such abuse of power. The genocide of about 3 000 Muslims by the fundamentalist governing party in Gujarat, India, is the latest in a series of such notorious acts by “democratic political” parties in South Asia. Afghanistan, the newest member of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), is teetering in all respects following its rule by the fundamentalist Taliban regime, toppled by the U.S.-led coalition’s invasion in 2001. Suicide bombing in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Afghanistan is far from novel, while Bangladesh, India, and Nepal also occasionally experience such horrific acts. Political killing is also not new in the region: the latest example is the killing of Benazir Bhutto of Pakistan, the first Muslim woman prime minister in the world, but the region has seen other political assassinations in the past—Mahatma Gandhi, Indira Gandhi, and Rajeev Gandhi of India; Liaquat Ali Khan, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, and Ziaul Haq of Pakistan; Sheikh Mujibar Rahman and Ziaur Rahman of Bangladesh; Birendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev of Nepal; and Ranasinghe Premadasa of Sri Lanka, to name a few.

The region has more than 1 000 languages and several ethnic groups. This has created tensions between ethnic groups and the governments that represent the mainstream (Clark 1991). The tension between the pahari and bangali ethnic groups in the Chittagong Hill Tracts in Bangladesh, and the independence movements by some ethnic groups in the “seven sisters” in Eastern India, are just two examples. Nepal has faced similar problems because of Maoist movements. Pakistan, too, has confronted similar issues for several years: Shiite–Sunni tensions have claimed many lives. For decades, the tiny island country of Sri Lanka has fought against the separatist LTTE, who persistently staged violence and waged traditional war against the Sri Lankan Army.

Thus, it is apparent that almost all South Asian countries have encountered some sort of serious trouble that is rooted in ethnic differences. Nevertheless, the problem that has caused the greatest damage to the region’s economic, social, political, and cultural aspects is the issue of Kashmir. While Kashmir was historically an independent state, both India and Pakistan have been claiming it as theirs since the ousting of the British by the successful non-violent non-cooperation movement of the people of what was then United India, led by Mahatma Gandhi, in 1947. On 13 August 1948, one year after the creation of India and Pakistan, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution No. 47, which gave all authority to the Kashmiri people to write their own future—whether to merge with India, to merge with Pakistan, or to be an independent country. Unfortunately, the government of India has never accepted this resolution, and the Kashmiri people have therefore never had a chance to cast their votes to decide their fate. The result is that Kashmir is divided in two parts, two-thirds ruled by India, the rest by

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Pakistan, and nothing by the Kashmiris. Both India and Pakistan have wasted billions of dollars on this dispute that could otherwise have been used to improve the welfare of the poor—health, education, food, and shelter alike.

The Role of Civil Society in South Asia

The definition of the term “civil society” determines how civil society is conceptualized (Watson 2002). Chris Allen (1997) characterizes it as having two main elements: NGOs and “autonomous societal groups.” For Allen, these two groups behave differently from the state, act as watchdogs, and engage themselves in conflict with governments to achieve and maintain democratic rule and atmosphere in a country. Cathy McIlwaine (1998), however, argues that civil society is not created spontaneously but, rather, must be created by groups of people. Civil societies do not exhibit any direct power, nor do they share power institutionally with governments, but they protest and bargain against and with governments to shape an improved future society, the goals being to maintain democracy, societal values, ethics, laws, and norms.

The role of civil society in South Asia is similar, although it varies depending on particular countries’ political, social, and cultural atmospheres. NGOs have grown in most parts of this region to play an important role as partners of civil society, along with intellectuals, informed citizens’ groups, women activists’ groups, and environmentalists. The primary reason for nurturing NGOs in South Asia is economic: they bring funds from developed countries and act as development partners for governments. Without doubt, NGOs such as Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC), the largest NGO in the world, and the Grameen Bank, founded by Nobel laureate Professor Muhammad Yunus of Bangladesh, have brought economic solvency, at least in terms of promoting the survival of the poor. The models of these two organizations have been followed not only by other South Asian nations but by countries on other continents as well. The poor are now better off than they were three decades ago; however, the Human Development Indices of South Asian countries remain low, and overall economic conditions are still precarious.

A remarkable improvement in South Asian countries fostered by the NGOs is the empowerment of women (Devine 2006; Islam and Ahsan 1996). However, some scholars believe that women’s participation still depends on local elites and on household heads (Clark 1991; Devine 2006). Despite such scepticism, it is evident that people’s participation in development programs in general, and women’s participation specifically, has grown in this populous region of the globe over the past two decades. This has improved women’s empowerment—at least marginally (Devine 2006; Staudt 1991). It is worth mentioning that the trends of success of NGOs in South Asian countries are
not uniform, but exhibit a differentiated character. On many occasions, NGOs have not succeeded in achieving their goals of empowering women and increasing participation in development programs due to people’s religious constraints and beliefs (Islam and Ahsan 1996).

The autonomous societal group is another partner of civil society that engages in conflict with the government in order to promote democracy. Such groups include scholars (e.g., university teachers), elite businessmen, and civil servants. However, although these groups have been participating in development issues in South Asian countries, in many instances they work as interest groups, motivated by self-interest. They also lend their support, for selfish reasons, to one political party or another. Along with some NGOs, they often serve mainly the interest of political parties and of the government (Devine 2006). The Bangladeshi NGO Proshika11 exhibits this character and has strayed from its ethical path of acting as an element of civil society, having worked for a specific political party. In early 2004, the main opposition party in Bangladesh declared a specific date (30 April 2004) on which it wanted to topple the then legitimate government, in violation of the country’s constitution. The opposition party declared that it would bring 3 million people from rural areas to the capital city, stage an agitation movement against the government, and do anything necessary to remove that government. It was later revealed that Proshika had promised the opposition party to bring its borrowing members to the capital and force them to agitate against the democratically elected government. It is worth mentioning here that such acts by NGOs are not only against the laws of specific countries but also violations of the noble ethics of an NGO—to help disadvantaged groups of the society and work as partners of “good” civil society.

**Assessing the Applicability of Normative Planning in South Asian Cities**

In this section, I examine the characteristics of different constituents of normative planning and explore whether the current socio-politico-economic milieu is suitable for the application of normative planning in this region. The principal element of a multicultural approach is the visible presence of a benevolent, unbiased, and fair civil society that acts as the pivotal agent of societal change. This approach proposes planning influenced by advocacy groups representing diversified citizens based on race, gender, and ethnicity so that all segments are represented and none is excluded (Sandercock 1998a, 2000).

Planning ought to be done outside the government system of administration and economy (Sandercock 1998b). If the civil society plays its fair role in terms of ethics, norms, societal rules, and democracy, normative planning can yield better results than traditional top-down planning approaches that are donor driven, often sectoral, and weakly managed by the state (Watson 2002).
Unfortunately, civil society in South Asia is politically motivated. Claims to borrow money from donor countries and agencies in order to work impartially and relentlessly to help eradicate poverty, establish human rights, and provide basic needs to the poor are spurious. In South Asia, consensus is frequently achieved on a temporary basis, outside established institutions and divorced from power. This does not always produce the intended outcomes and does not serve the community en masse. The stakeholders come to a consensus for their own interests and benefits, which do not help the society as a whole but benefit the stakeholders alone. Many NGOs and members of civil society in this region are corrupt at the personal and institutional levels; they cannot escape their own avarice in order to act as neutral pressure groups on government (Devine 2006). Because the civil society is politically motivated, it has been a platitude that like-minded NGOs and members of civil society keep silent or even support the “wrongdoings” and planning of governments that share similar views. Such clientelistic and unethical behaviour on the part of corrupt members of civil society means that groups act as interest groups instead of pressure groups in this region, motivated by power and greed. The existence of such a dysfunctional civil society not only makes it difficult to change society from the grassroots level but also acts as a deterrent to building a path toward a better society through better planning. The negative roles played by civil society act as a frictional force to impede the introduction and practice of the multicultural approach to normative planning in South Asia.

Sandercock’s (1998a, 1998b, 2000) recognition and celebration of identity may not be applicable to South Asian cities, as the struggle of majority of the citizens in this region is driven by the politics of materialism, not by the politics of lifestyle or identity. Most countries in the region, apart from India, are troubled by political instability, while all are stigmatized by corruption, inefficiency, and nepotism. All South Asian countries have ranked high on the Corruption Perceptions Index over the past few years. India and Pakistan have spent billions of dollars on armed conflict since gaining independence in 1947. Unconstitutional attempts to topple elected governments are not new to the region. The people of South Asia face all sorts of urban problems generated by poverty, scarcity of resources, and skewed distributions of wealth. Their first preference is to survive; then come housing, health, and education. Questions of identity or lifestyle, which may be of major concern to citizens of North America and Western Europe, are far behind the above-mentioned factors for the people of South Asian cities. Sandercock’s propositions thus have limited application to the cities of this region. One point deserves clarification, however: South Asia does not experience colour-based race problems. Although problems of religion, class, and ethnicity, which are obviously criteria for identity, do exist, generally race is less important to the people of this region than securing basic materials for survival.

The communicative planning approach focuses on smaller administra-
tive and geographic units of a nation or government and considers that planners ought to be primary actors of the societal system. Storytelling and non-neutral values of planners are important to this approach (Mandelbaum 1996, 2000), which proposes transforming a nation toward democratization by empowering local governments and organizations (Innes 1995; Mohan and Stokke 2000). Similar trust is bestowed by the multicultural approach in its “politics of many,” that is, democracy and local knowledge of people (Sandercock 1998a, 1998b, 2000), which accords with the expert knowledge of Healey (1999). In South Asia, however, it has been almost impossible for locals outside the broader structural forces to solve their economic problems. Planning practices have persistently been top-down, and people’s participation in the planning process has been minimal in the past. The typical planner in South Asia is a government employee, and s/he must follow her/his employer’s directives. S/he plans within corrupt administrative systems and cannot represent a specific group within society because s/he is paid by the government. The overall environment within which s/he performs planning tasks is not democratic but authoritarian. Although most South Asian countries, including Nepal, Bangladesh, and Bhutan, are proceeding through the structural adjustment policies of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, India directs its own adjustment policies, being a powerful member of these two world organizations. Some South Asian countries have strong systems of local government (e.g., India) and organizations, while others do not. Local actors in most countries are incapable of conducting and managing plans that are suitable for themselves. Although localism is very important to the communicative approach of planning practice (Smith 2000), current socio-political conditions in South Asia is not hospitable to it. Prevailing conditions are apparently unsuited to the application of communicative planning in South Asian cities at their current stage of development, with the minor exceptions of a few Indian states such as Kerala (Chettiparamb 2006).

The Just City approach proposes that a nation needs responsible institutional and administrative systems to achieve social development (Fainstein 2000). Fainstein’s economic world has a capitalist bias that tends toward continuing economic growth; Fainstein believes in entrepreneurialism and in a welfare state responsible for the social and economic well-being of the citizenry. For her, the Just City will distribute its resources among the people of their society. This approach requires huge monetary resources for the physical reshaping of cities, which the poor cities of South Asia cannot afford. This approach also assumes a strong regulatory system that can police and hold growth at the urban edge, and it assumes that the edge is not occupied by spreading informal settlements. But South Asian cities exhibit feeble regulatory systems, incapable of policing growth at the urban edges and preserving them from illegal occupation. In reality, the edges of South Asian cities are in
general expanding fast, in the form of unplanned mushroom-type development characterized by high population density and lack of basic infrastructure. The edges are expanding in non-uniform patterns, and many parts are seized by informal settlers who wield political clout through violent tactics. Further, South Asian countries, cities, and planning bodies have maintained distance from both the entrepreneurial and the welfare nature of government, and are therefore not distributive in nature, as required by the Just City approach. Thus, Fainstein’s equitable Amsterdam-like city is merely a dream in South Asia, at least at this stage of the region’s development. I suggest, therefore, that the Just City approach is not applicable to South Asian cities, where a major proportion of the population is poor and about 30% of people live in bastees.

It appears, then, that Western-style normative views of planning (e.g., the multicultural approach, the communicative approach, and the Just City approach), are not applicable to South Asian cities at their current stage, which is characterized by a top-down approach to planning, popular participation in development initiatives, mushroom-type expansion at the edges of cities, and illegal occupation of public lands, coupled with huge influx of people from rural to city areas. Since the introduction of a Lacanian perspective is in its infancy in the Western planning literature, its suitability for application in South Asia needs to be scrutinized in the future but certainly not at the current stage.

Conclusions

South Asian cities have more in common than not. These commonalities have prevailed over time because of their common histories, common cultures, similar economic situations, and similar languages, as well as the similar physical shapes of their cities. Current conditions in the region’s large cities have been highly influenced, first, by the long rule of the Mughal Emperors (from the 11th to the 18th centuries), and then by British colonial planning practices for the next 200 years (Dutt and Pomeroy 2008). The presence of bazaars, central mosques or temples, playgrounds, and chowks (perpendicular intersections of two main roads in a city) is common to New Delhi, Dhaka, Karachi, Colombo, Mumbai, and Kolkata alike. Despite differences in political systems, these cities have similar planning functions, scopes, and, most importantly, planning outlooks—which have traditionally focused on physical planning. This is likely to remain the trend into the future, despite recent bends in planning practices in minuscule places such as the Indian state of Kerala (Chettiparamb 2006). Such similarities in planning practices among cities provide a fertile and common field for investigation of normative planning practices in South Asian cities.

For some time, planning has been an important phenomenon in policy
making in the context of South Asia’s political, social, and economic development problems, through harnessing both human and material resources and their proper utilization (Zahid 1996). To achieve targeted rates of growth, the governments of South Asian countries have made pragmatic national development plans for each sectoral activity, consisting of long-term, mid-term, and short-term plans. Apart from these, it is rare in this region for planners to follow the planning theories informed by North American and Western European scholars. There is some scope for the application of these exotic planning theories in South Asian countries, but experimentation requires some basic changes in the structural systems of administration, improvements in economic sectors, eradication of corruption from society, and ethical development among civil society.

The planning profession in South Asia is complicated by myriad agencies for approvals and licensure and by the various associations (or affiliations) to which planners belong (Chettiparamb 2006). One problem faced by the cities and towns of South Asia, and specifically by secondary cities and towns, is that they typically do not have professional planning positions within their administrative structure. Thus individuals are working as “planners” despite not having proper knowledge of planning theories or basic pedagogical training in planning ethics and norms of society. In such a situation, it is unlikely that the people will get the requisite benefits from the “planners” who shape their community—whether spatially, economically, socially, or environmentally.

Government organizations frequently lack the resources to make appropriate plans or, once plans are made, to implement them. The lack of resources is thus detrimental to the application of planning and planning theory in the cities of South Asia (Zahid 1996). In addition, planners are frequently unethical and serve the interests of elite groups within their societies, whereas their responsibility should instead be to serve the people and to promote social justice. The situation therefore becomes one in which planners, NGOs, and autonomous societal groups consort to play the role of a “devil society” instead of a “civil society.” Although this phenomenon seems surprising, it is a sad reality in the South Asian context today. This limits the intended application of planning, as well as planning theories in general and Western-style normative planning in particular, in South Asian cities. In the past, efforts have been made by planning commissions in different countries to replicate planning techniques practised in developed world (Peattie 1987; Neuman 2005). Using inappropriate distant planning techniques has imperilled successful efforts in the past, contributed to the waste of borrowed resources, and brought on disastrous and unfortunate consequences that have retarded the local planning process and progressive development (De Jong et al. 2003; Neuman 2005).

It remains the case that the problems of cities in this region can be overcome through the practice of democracy. Although most South Asian
countries (the exceptions being India, Sri Lanka, and Maldives) have not enjoyed much democracy in the past, there are positive signs for democracy throughout the region. Recent parliamentary elections in Pakistan, Nepal, and Bhutan are signs of the future democratization of these societies—provided the military junta in Pakistan, the Maoist group in Nepal, and the royal family in Bhutan do not destabilize the elected governments. Similarly, Bangladesh is setting the stage for a new start after a military-backed caretaker government ruled the country from January 2007 to December 2009. Democratization needs to be continued diligently, however, so that people’s participation increases in all aspects of life. They deserve to have their voices heard when designing their cities and societies, and to achieve their own empowerment. Only then can normative planning theories be applicable and fruitful in South Asian cities.

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Notes
1 The South Asian countries include Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bhutan, Maldives, and Afghanistan.
2 Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka were colonized by the British for about 200 years. Many scholars and South Asian people believe that their current economic hardship is largely due to the British colonization of their countries.
3 “The politics of many” means that the views of many cultures, races, ethnicities, and so on are to be respected and given full consideration; no valid claim should be turned down.
4 The upazila is the third planning stratum in Bangladesh, next to the district level.
5 The union parishad is the fourth and lowest level in Bangladesh’s planning system. This type of planning hierarchy is common in South Asia, although different terminologies are used in different countries based on language differences.
6 Bastee is a term used in South Asia as a synonym for the slums located in the central cities as well as for the squatter settlements usually located on the peripheries of large cities in Third World countries.
7 The rickshaw, a popular mode of transportation in South Asian cities, is a three-wheeled vehicle. Some cities have rickshaws pulled directly by the puller, while in other cities the rickshaws have paddles that the puller uses to move the vehicle forward. Two passengers can ride on a rickshaw at a time. Most bastee men in large South Asian cities are employed in this informal sector.
8 In seven provinces in eastern India, ethnic groups have staged movements for independence from India. These provinces—Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram, Tripura, Meghalaya, and Assam—are known as the “seven sisters.”
9 The Babri Mosque was built by the Emperor Babar during the 16th century. In 1992, Bishaw Hindu Parishad and its allies demolished the mosque, with direct help from the opposition BJP. The then ruling Indian Congress Party did not take the necessary measures to protect the religious rights of minority Muslim citizens. Finally, on 6 December 1992, the mosque was demolished, and the religious flag of Hinduism was hoisted atop the mosque.

10 United India included present-day India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. On 14 August 1947, Pakistan declared its independence; India declared its independence on the following day, 15 August 1947. At that time, Pakistan was a fragmented country with two wings, West Pakistan (present-day Pakistan) and East Pakistan (present-day Bangladesh). East Pakistan and West Pakistan fought for nine months in 1971; on 16 December 1971, East Pakistan became the independent People’s Republic of Bangladesh.

11 Proshika is the third largest NGO in Bangladesh. There have been many allegations against the authorities of this NGO and its allies, including that they have forced poor borrowing members to be involved in and support the political stand of Proshika. Several lawsuits are ongoing against the administration of Proshika regarding (1) misuse of borrowed money in the name of helping the poor, (2) illegal involvement in politics, and (3) trying to uproot an elected government.

References


