Evidence to Correct Misperceptions About Rorschach Norms
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Possible factors affecting normative shifts in Rorschach data are considered, including (a) genuine changes in mental health over time, (b) alterations in the type of target sample under consideration, (c) evolving scoring rules, and (d) variations in test administration skills or context. I show that the Comprehensive System (CS) criteria for coding form quality have changed substantially over time. Building on the extensive research of others, I also show that CS data collected around the world from people tested outside of a clinical context look somewhat less healthy than Exner’s reference sample of socially/vocationally functioning nonpatients but somewhat more healthy than Exner’s reference sample of people starting outpatient psychotherapy. Furthermore, preliminary results from Exner’s new nonpatient sample recruited using the same procedures as before reveals scores that are generally quite similar to the existing reference values. The assertion that CS norms overpathologize people is not supported.

Key words: Rorschach, Comprehensive System, norms, normative changes, test scores, types of norms.

Determining why normative values for a test may change is not easy. For instance, intelligence test scores have been changing at a dramatic rate, though the cause remains unclear (Flynn, 1999; Raven, 2000). Each time an IQ test is renormed, the same level of cognitive capacity is associated with a lower score. The ability that would have produced an IQ of 100 two generations ago would now only produce an IQ between 82 and 64, depending on the test. Thus, the average person from two generations ago would now look 1.2 to 2.4 standard deviations (SDs) more impaired (i.e., Cohen’s d of –1.2 to –2.4). Stated more dramatically, the day an IQ test is renormed, it begins “to label thousands of children as mentally retarded who had escaped the label the previous day” (Flynn, 1999, p. 12). End users of the test often are not aware of this shift because IQ is not reported in raw scores. Instead, each time a test is renormed, the average IQ value is recalibrated and, by definition, arbitrarily reset to equal 100.

Similarly, many users of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI)-2 or MMPI-A are not aware of how symptom reports changed between the initial and contemporary norms because raw scores are transformed so a T score of 50 defines what is average, regardless of the actual symptoms reported. Nonetheless, people now endorse more symptoms. For instance, on scale 4 (Psychopathic Deviate) and scale 6 (paranoia), adults now score about .50 to .75 of a SD higher, while adolescents now score about 1.0 to 1.5 SDs higher. These changes correspond to d values between .5 and 1.5, which are somewhat larger than the mean differences reported by Wood, Nezworski, Garb, and Lilienfeld in this issue for their selected subset of 14 Rorschach scores.1

To understand possible normative shifts for the Rorschach Comprehensive System (CS), at least four factors must be considered. First, it is possible that scores have changed because people have genuinely changed. Although Wood et al. did not address this issue, research suggests psychopathology has increased over time (e.g., Fombonne, 1994, 1998; Kelleher, McInerny, Gardner, Childs, & Wasserman, 2000; Swindle, Heller, Pesceiosolido, & Kikuzawa, 2000; Twenge, 2000). Accordingly, a valid measure of pathology should track those changes to show somewhat increased rates of mental health problems.

A second critical factor concerns the type of sample under consideration. Nonpatients defined by some positive evidence of health are not the same as nonpatients defined by no prior treatment history, and neither is equivalent to a nationally representative or census-matched sample. According to the recent Surgeon General’s report, within a 12-month period, about 28% of the U.S. population will have a diagnosable mental or addictive disorder, as determined by a limited subset of diagnoses (U.S. Department of Health, 1999). Lifetime rates of disorder are substantially higher. One of the studies informing the Surgeon General’s report (Kessler et al., 1994) found that 48% of the population has a lifetime history of at least one disorder (out of 14 examined). This study also found that about 28% of the population seeks treatment at some point in their life, and about 8% seek

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treatment even though they do not have a diagnosable disorder.

Kessler et al.’s (1994) figures allow one to estimate the rate of lifetime disorder in different types of samples. The best evidence suggests that about 78% of the people seeking treatment would have a diagnosable disorder. About 48% of a nationally representative sample would have a lifetime disorder. In a nonpatient sample defined by the absence of a treatment history, about 39% would have a disorder. In nonpatients defined by no treatment history and positive evidence of health, such as functioning in the educational, vocational, and interpersonal spheres (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services [DHHS], 1999), the rate of disorder is unknown, though it certainly would be lower than any of the prior categories because psychiatric disorders are associated with unemployment, withdrawal from social or community participation, and lower income, education, and work functioning (DHHS, 1999; Kessler & Frank, 1997; Kessler et al., 1994). Thus, nonpatient samples that combine even a single positive criterion, such as gainful employment, with an absent treatment history will have the lowest rate of psychiatric disturbance.

Exner’s (1993) nonpatient reference sample consists of people with no history of mental health treatment and some positive evidence of healthy functioning. Specifically, 69% of the people were recruited through their job, and an additional 25% were recruited through social or interest organizations (e.g., PTA, Audubon Society). Thus, 94% of the sample demonstrated some positive evidence of functioning and health, in addition to having no prior treatment. Although Wood et al. dismisses the notion that Exner’s sample was healthier than average, the fact is that the recruitment procedures should obtain healthier volunteers than (a) using the absence of a treatment history as the sole selection criterion or (b) obtaining a representative sample of the population that includes people regardless of their treatment history, psychiatric history, employment status, or social functioning.

Personality tests that use a representative sample of the population as the reference standard (e.g., MMPI-2, Personality Assessment Inventory [PAI]) incorporate a substantial degree of pathology into their definition of what is normal or average. To the extent that MMPI-2 or PAI norms parallel a nationally representative sample, T scores on the tests implicitly assume that it is normal for 48% of the population to have a lifetime history of psychiatric disorders. There is nothing wrong with using this as a standard for health. However, it is quite different from the traditional CS standard.

Although Wood et al. referred to their 32 samples as “nonpatients,” at least 5 explicitly included current or former psychiatric patients (Jacques, 1990/1991; Jansak, 1996/1997; Schiff, 1992/1993; Van Horn, 1996; Waehler, 1991; see also Waehler, 1995). Other samples included people expected to have psychiatric difficulties (e.g., Hallet, 1996; Wald, Archer, & Winstead, 1990), subjects known to be low functioning (Burns, 1993/1994), poor people who participated because they needed the money (Jacques, 1990/1991), or people tested under atypical circumstances (e.g., Goldfinger [1998/1999] had subjects wear psychophysiological electrodes, did not let them touch the cards, and instructed them to remain as motionless as possible during the testing). Furthermore, the largest study (Meyer, 1989/1991) accepted anyone who would volunteer to be tested for a full day, including people with active or prior psychiatric conditions and people who had used or were using psychiatric medications, outpatient therapy, or inpatient treatment. Eleven additional samples also did not employ any psychiatric screening criteria (Alexander, 1997/1998; Calkins, 1980/1981; Erstad, 1995/1996 [two samples]; Greenwald, 1990; Hayslip, McBride, Lowaman, & Aronson, 1992; Kranau, 1983/1984; Perry & Kinder, 1992; Smith, Hillard, Walsh, Kubacki, & Morgan, 1991; Zacker, 1997; Zlotogorski, Hahnemann, & Wiggs, 1987). At least eight other samples used some screening criterion but nonetheless still would have included people with active or past disorders and/or treatment histories (Caine, Frueh, & Kinder, 1995; DeLucas, 1997; Frueh & Kinder, 1994; Hilsenroth, 1996/1997; Kadle, 1989; Lipkin, 1988/1989; Meisner, 1988; Netter & Viglione, 1994). Overall, at least 90% of Wood et al.’s samples fall into these categories. It should be obvious that these samples target a broader range of the population than Exner’s reference group and thus should obtain somewhat less healthy CS scores if the CS is a valid personality measure.

Based on existing research, all the samples of elderly subjects were expected to produce atypical Rorschachs, much like the elderly show raw score decrements on other types of tasks (e.g., Baltes, 1997; Wechsler, 1997). Research also indicates college students have areas of symptomatology that exceed that seen in a representative sample or even in a psychiatric population. The best evidence comes from Morey’s (1991) PAI. College students (N = 1,051) are more disturbed than a census-matched sample (N = 1,000) and a representative clinical sample (N = 1,246) on the egocentric and stimulus-seeking subscales of antisocial features, on mania and its subscales of grandiosity and activity level, and on verbal aggression. College students and the clinical sample are more disturbed than the census-matched sample on psychotic experiences and manic irritability. Finally, college students fall between the clinical and census samples on antisocial behaviors and the borderline features of identity problems, self-harm, and affective instability. Given these data, asserting that college students or the elderly mimic Exner’s nonpatient sample would appear to serve no useful scientific goal.

An interesting feature of the PAI reference samples is the relative lack of difference between the clinical and census-matched samples. About 35% of the PAI’s clinical sample were outpatients, about 25% inpatients, and the remainder came from alcohol abuse programs (13.6%), correctional facilities (10.2%), or other settings. Although all 53 PAI scales show elevations in the clinical sample, the magnitude of difference between the clinical and census sample is often relatively small. For instance, 34 of the scales (64%) have a Cohen’s d of .75 or less. No scales have a d > 1.11. Thus, a large clinical sample, 25% of whom were inpatients, produces PAI results that are often rather similar to the levels of symptomatology observed in a census-matched sample. Similarly modest differences have been observed for a census-matched MMPI-2 sample relative to an inpatient population (Mj |d| = .60 over 42 scales) and for the MMPI-A normative sample relative to a mostly inpatient (81%) sample (Mj |d| = .48 over 35 scales; see Schinka, Elkins, & Archer, 1998; Schinka, LaLone, & Greene, 1998). These findings are not terribly surprising given that about half of a representative sample should have a history of at least one diagnosable disorder (Kessler et al., 1994). However, they also suggest CS scores should begin to look more like a patient sample as one moves from a target like Exner’s socially-vocationally functioning nonpatients to a target that is more representative of the full population.

A third important consideration for understanding Rorschach reference data is the prospect that subtle scoring changes may have emerged as the CS evolved. To the extent that scoring rules have been clarified over time or new standards implemented, more recent samples may appear different when that is not the case.

To address CS changes, one needs to examine the published scoring criteria in detail. One basic question concerns the extent to which Exner’s form-quality tables have changed. As part of a broader project, I have been tabulating this information. Although still unfinished, the initial results are illuminating. The 1974 and 1995 form-quality tables for Cards I–VIII list about 1,750 identical percepts. Of the good form entries in 1974, only about half continue to be listed as good form (i.e., FQ0) in 1995. The rest are now split between the two poor form categories (FQ1 ≈ 45%; FQ2 ≈ 6%). Thus, there has been a substantial and apparently unnoticed shift in the form-quality tables over time. Because of this, relative to protocols that were collected and scored in the early years of the CS (and Exner’s nonpatients were collected before 1985), contemporarype samples should have noticeably lower scores on X+%, and F+, noticeably higher scores on Xu%, and somewhat higher scores on X–%, S–%, M–, and the SCZI.

With this in mind, I examined the early literature on form quality. I searched the Journal of Personality Assessment from 1974 to 1985 and found 48 adult samples from 14 articles that reported X+% scored by the CS. Sixty percent of the samples were expected to be psychologically impaired, while the remaining 40% were nonclinical or control samples (none of which were included in Wood et al.). Across all 48 samples, including outpatients, inpatients, and patients with schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and borderline personality disorder, the weighted mean X+% was .70 (N = 1,517). Thus, the average X+% for clinical and control samples scored about 20 years ago is 1.26 SDs higher than the value of .51 that Shaffer, Erdborg, and Haroian (1999) found in a contemporary nonpatient sample. In fact, the clinical samples from 20 years ago had an X+% that was about .90 SDs higher than the Shaffer et al. nonpatient sample (i.e., .64 vs .51).

Although Wood et al. attributed the large difference they observed in form-quality scores to an error in Exner’s nonpatient norms, this was an incorrect attribution.
Exner’s norms are quite consistent with the early CS literature. Had Wood et al. expanded the scope of their review, they would have seen that contemporary nonpatient samples produce worse form-quality scores than Exner’s nonpatients and the patient samples described in the early CS literature.

Clearly, the shift in the CS form-quality tables has generated an unappreciated problem. It must be factored in when considering any contemporary data. Furthermore, in order to make meaningful comparisons with the existing reference samples, the protocols in the reference samples would have to be rescorded according to current form-quality standards.

With respect to other scoring changes, examples in Exner’s 1974 text can be contrasted with the same examples in Exner’s 1993 text (e.g., Tables 12, 13, and 14 in 1993 are equivalent to Tables 7, 8, and 10 in 1974). While there are no changes to some determinants (Fr+H, FD, M, FM, n), many color or shading examples now contain additional elaborations that help justify the assigned code. For chromatic color, achromatic color, texture, vista, and diffuse shading, about 15–50% of the examples have been modified at least slightly. Some of these changes relate to revised scoring criteria for C’ and Y (for which reference protocols were rescorded; cf. Exner, 1974 vs. 1986). However, the overall pattern suggests that many determinants used to be assigned more liberally. Today an examinee must convey more specific information before the codes can be assigned, which may have implications for scores on Lambda or PureF%.

Other changes in the scoring examples include the more frequent assignment of secondary contents, idiographic contents that are now placed in classified content categories, decreased use of FQ+ relative to FQo, modified rules for scoring DQ, and a slight modification in assigned z scores. In addition, there are now clearer rules that make it less likely to observe white-space z scores for Cards III and X. These latter changes suggest that more contemporary samples may observe slightly different values for Zf, Zd, the Isolation Index, and the Intellectualization Index.

A fourth salient issue concerns the skill of the examiners who collect Rorschach records. Like any complex test, the Rorschach can only be administered properly after adequate training. Training is particularly critical at the inquiry stage because it is the examiner’s skill that clarifies information needed for scoring. In turn, the inquiry has an impact on many variables, including W, Dd, color, diffuse shading, achromatic color, texture, and vista, as well as the scores derived from these variables, including Lambda or PureF%, EA, es, D score, Adjusted D score, and EB styles. To date, more attention has focused on the adequacy of CS scoring than on procedures to ensure adequate administration. However, if contemporary samples are collected by relatively inexperienced examiners, regardless of scoring accuracy, the protocols could appear deviant.

It is well known that engagement with the Rorschach can be indexed by the number of responses (R) and Lambda (Meyer, 1999), and that task engagement moderates the elevation observed on many other CS scores (e.g., Meyer, 1992, 1993). Although task engagement can be a function of the person being tested or the testing context, it can also be a function of the examiner. Thus, it is worthwhile to examine the extent to which R and Lambda correlate with the 14 variables presented in Wood et al.’s review. This is particularly important because Wood et al. used some studies with odd data on these scores. In one study the original authors deliberately deleted about half of each participant’s responses (Perry & Kinder, 1992), reducing the average R to just 15. In another study, 44% of the sample had prior Rorschach training and produced an average R of 39 (Schiff, 1992/1993). Obviously, these are dramatically different types of samples.

For this analysis, I used Wood et al.’s samples (after correcting omissions; see below) and, to increase the number of observations, used subsamples within a study when possible. Despite the latter, the analyses were quite underpowered, with the number of observations ranging from just 6 to 25. Nonetheless, R was significantly correlated with FC, WSumC, SumY, SumT, Pure H, WSum6, and Afr in the range between .65 and .90. Lambda was significantly correlated with FC, WSumC, and Afr in the range between -.57 and -.66. These data underscore the importance of considering the structural relations among Rorschach variables when interpreting Wood et al.’s findings. They also highlight the importance of adequate task engagement on the part of examinees and adequate administration skills on the part of examiners.

With respect to Wood et al.’s analysis, several other problems can be noted. At times, they overlooked scores that were provided (e.g., using just 1 of 4 scores from Alexander, 1997/1998) or used the wrong data (e.g., using (H) rather than H in Hallett, 1996). In other instances, they did not use the SDs that were given (e.g., Kranau, 1983/1984) or that could be computed from the available information (e.g., Zlotogorski et al., 1987). In some
instances Wood et al. combined different samples in the same source (e.g., Alexander, 1997/1998; Burns, 1993/1994; Kranau, 1983/1984), while in other instances they did not (e.g., Erstad, 1995/1996). For some studies they estimated scores from available data (e.g., WSumC in Goldfinger, 1998/1999; Hallett, 1996; Van Horn, 1996; Zlotogorski et al., 1987), while in other studies they did not (e.g., WSumC in Kranau, 1983/1984). Wood et al. did not estimate $X+\%$, $X-\%$, and Lambda from Ritzler and Nalesnik (1990), even though these subjects had scores that were almost identical to Exner’s nonpatients. Wood et al. also overlooked at least one relevant study that obtained form quality, Lambda, and Popular scores quite consistent with Exner’s (Perry, Potterat, Auslander, Kaplan, & Jeste, 1996). Further, Wood et al. used biased data from Zacker (1997) because the author only reported scores that deviated significantly from Exner’s. Scores that did not differ were never included in Wood et al.’s review. Wood et al. also aggregated information across studies for scores in which coding rules have been revised over time. For instance, WSum6 was revised in 1991 and Popular in 1986. Yet Wood et al. mixed data that had been collected before and after these revisions.

Finally, the scope of Wood et al.’s review should be considered. It is misleading to think it was based on 32 samples because many studies provided data for just one or two scores. Only two studies provided data for all 14 variables under consideration. Second, Wood et al. seem to lose sight of the fact that they deliberately selected a limited subset of variables. From these they then generalized that the CS as a whole pathologizes patients.

To contend with many of the problems in Wood et al.’s review, it would be optimal to examine the full range of scores considered important to CS interpretation using relatively large samples that report all the relevant scores. Fortunately, Rorschach researchers from around the world have been collecting samples of people who were not tested in clinical settings. These samples provide a stringent test of the generalizability of the CS. They vary considerably in the procedures used to select participants, with some attempting to recruit nonpatients, some recruiting census-matched samples, and some essentially recruiting any person who was willing to be tested. Furthermore, the samples were tested across very different cultures using a multitude of languages and examiners with many differences in skill and training.

The data considered here are the adult samples presented in Erdberg and Shaffer’s (1999) international symposium, including Shaffer et al.’s (1999) from the United States ($N = 123$), Noriko Nakamura’s from Japan ($N = 240$), Vera Campo’s from Spain ($N = 520$), Jan Ivanouw’s from Denmark ($N = 72$), Carl-Erik Mattlar’s from Finland (see Mattlar et al., 1993; $N = 343$), Christian Mormont’s from Belgium ($N = 300$), Antonio Pires’s from Portugal (2000; $N = 309$), Matilda Raéz’s from Peru ($N = 164$), and Isidro Sanz’s from Argentina ($N = 54$). One other sample was excluded because it reported some erroneous results.

The weighted mean scores from these international samples were compared to two reference samples: Exner’s (1993) 700 nonpatients and his 440 outpatients beginning therapy. The latter provides a very appropriate anchor for comparison. To the extent that the diverse samples from around the world are representative of a full population and full range of functioning, their scores should start to approximate Exner’s outpatient values more than his socially/vocationally functioning nonpatients. To test this postulate, I examined the 69 scores included in the lower portion of a CS structural summary, as these scores form the foundation for clinical interpretations. Cohen’s $d$ was used to quantify deviations from Exner’s reference samples. The sign of each $d$ was determined empirically by the nonpatient and outpatient means, with positive values indicating greater health, and negative values indicating less health.

It should be recognized that the analyses considered here are much more comprehensive than those reported by Wood et al. (2001). Not only do the protocols come from many countries around the world, but the sample is about 3 times larger than Wood et al.’s average sample (2,125 vs. 686.8), and this review examines about 4.5 times as many CS scores (69 vs. 15).

Overall, across all 69 scores considered, the international sample was about four-tenths of an SD more impaired than Exner’s nonpatients (i.e., $M_{d} = -.38$) and about equal to Exner’s outpatients ($M_{d} = .03$). However, from prior analyses, we know that form–quality rules have changed over time. Indeed, the largest differences between the international sample and both of Exner’s reference samples were for the form–quality variables. Setting these scores aside, the composite sample was about three-tenths of an SD more “pathological” than Exner’s nonpatients (i.e., $M_{d} = -.31$) and about one-tenth of an SD healthier than Exner’s outpatients ($M_{d} = .08$).

Translated into more familiar assessment terms, if Exner’s nonpatient sample means were set at a $T$ score =
50, like on the MMPI-2, the pooled international sample would have a mean $T$ score of 53. Alternatively, using an IQ metric, if Exner’s nonpatient means were set at 100, the international sample would have an average score of 95. This degree of increased “pathology” is actually less than one would see if an intelligence test was renormed after 20 years (Flynn, 1999). Considering how the international sample also reflects a different type of normative target than Exner’s nonpatients, it should be clear that the CS norms do not overpathologize.

The central unresolved question is what a contemporary nonpatient sample would look like if it was collected using Exner’s initial procedures (i.e., trained examiners recruiting people with no treatment history though their jobs or social groups). This project has been underway for the past year. Although Exner will publish full results when data collection is complete, I compared the first 100 people in this new group to the initial nonpatients and outpatients. On average, the new sample is about two-tenths of an SD less healthy than the existing nonpatients but about three-tenths of an SD more healthy than the outpatients. Thus, the new sample would have an average $T$ score of 52 or an average IQ score of 97. These differences are trivial.

Overall, the data support four primary conclusions. First, there have been formerly unappreciated changes in CS form-quality codes. It is now easier to obtain unusual and minus scores. Second, through the extensive effort of many individuals, CS reference data have been collected around the world, including the Northern and Southern hemispheres, Asia, Europe, and the Americas, using a diverse set of examiners with variable levels of training who administered the test in very different cultures and languages to people with a wide range of mental health characteristics. As would be expected, the international data appear to reflect the degree of pathology that would be fairly characteristic of a general population. Their scores look a bit worse than Exner’s nonpatient reference sample, but also somewhat healthier than his outpatients starting therapy. Third, using the same recruitment procedures as before, preliminary results for Exner’s new nonpatient sample look quite similar to the existing reference values. Fourth, the data contradict Wood et al.’s global conclusions.

NOTES

1. One could reasonably point out that the initial MMPI sample was not a nationally representative sample and that changes like those described may not reflect historical change but instead should be expected when moving from a more restrictive sample to a more heterogeneous sample. As will be seen, I believe the same argument applies when considering Rorschach scores.

2. The list of studies is available on request. One study reported $F/+$ rather than $X/+. However, there was almost no difference between these 2 scores in 26 samples that reported both, so $F/+$ was substituted for $X/+$ in this study. Across samples, the means were trivially different when Exner’s results were compared to those of other investigators (.71 vs. .68, respectively). However, as would be expected for a valid score, the means were substantially different when comparing the target samples to the control samples (.64 vs. .78, respectively; Cohen’s $d = 1.05$).

3. Wood et al. (see their note 2) indicated that I now have reservations about the administration and scoring of the protocols collected for my dissertation sample. This is true. Those protocols were obtained and scored by graduate students in a first-year assessment sequence. Although I never rated the quality of administration, scoring reliability clearly varied from student to student. Also, by contrasting concerns I have now with quotes from my dissertation, Wood et al. convey the not-so-subtle message that I am being inconsistent. I am. And I am pleased to have learned new things about reliability and the intricacies of Rorschach research over the past 11 years.

4. A table containing means and $d$ values for each of the 69 scores is available on request.

5. A table of distributional parameters and $d$ values for each score is available on request.

REFERENCES


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