

DECLARATION ON LIBERATED EUROPE*

DOCUMENT NO. 6

We have drawn up and subscribed to a Declaration on Liberated Europe. This Declaration provides for concerting the policies of the three Powers and for joint action by them in meeting the political and economic problems of liberated Europe in accordance with democratic principles. The text of the Declaration is as follows:

The Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, and the President of the United States of America have consulted with each other in the common interests of the peoples of their countries and those of liberated Europe. They jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems.

The establishment of order in Europe and the rebuilding of national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of Nazism and Fascism and to creat[e] democratic institutions of their own choice. This is a principle of the Atlantic Charter—the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live—the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived of them by the aggressor nations.

To foster the conditions in which the liberated peoples may exercise these rights, the three governments will jointly assist the people in any European liberated state or former Axis satellite state in Europe where in their judgment conditions require (a) to establish conditions of internal peace; (b) to carry out emergency measures for the relief of distressed people; (c) to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people; and (d) to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections.

The three governments will consult the other United Nations and provisional authorities or other governments in Europe when matters of direct interest to them are under consideration.

When, in the opinion of the three governments, conditions in any European liberated state or any former Axis satellite state in Europe make such action necessary, they will immediately consult together on the measures necessary to discharge the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration.

By this declaration we reaffirm our faith in the principles of the Atlantic Charter, our pledge in the Declaration by the United Nations, and our determination to build in cooperation with other peace-loving nations a world order under law, dedicated to peace, security, freedom and the general well-being of all mankind.

In issuing this declaration, the Three Powers express the hope that the Provisional Government of the French Republic may be associated with them in the procedure suggested.

*FRUS, 1945, "The Conference of Malta and Yalta," pp. 971-73.

**THE AMBASSADOR IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA
(STEINHARDT) TO THE
SECRETARY OF STATE* DOCUMENT NO. 21**

SECRET

PRAHA, May 7, 1946—midnight.
[Received May 8—5:20 p.m.]

727. For the Secretary and Riddleberger. President Beneš asked me to call to see him this morning. He said he was becoming increasingly concerned at the insistence of the Hungarian Govt on creating what he described as a state within a state by seeking minority rights for the Hungarians residing in Czechoslovakia. He pointed out that the prewar German and Hungarian minorities in Czechoslovakia had opened the gates to the Nazis in 1938 and 1939 and expressed the opinion that as the German minority was being transferred to Germany under the Potsdam decision, the Hungarian minority should likewise be transferred to Hungary. He argued that as Hungary was transferring its German minority to Germany, the Hungarian minority from Czechoslovakia should take the place of these individuals and that, therefore, the claim of the Hungarian Govt that there would be no space available to receive its minority from Czechoslovakia was not made in good faith, but was advanced solely for the purpose of maintaining a Hungarian bridgehead in Czechoslovakia. He indicated on the map that a Hungarian bridgehead in Slovakia might be as dangerous at some time in the future as was the German bridgehead in Bohemia at the outbreak of the last war.

Beneš then stated that in the course of the talks between the Czechoslovak representatives in Paris and Molotov, when the former had stressed the desire of the Czechoslovak Govt to transfer its Hungarian minority to Hungary, Molotov had indicated his acquiescence but had added "I must first find out how the Americans feel about it as without the Americans I can do nothing." Beneš added with obvious relish that he had repeated Molotov's remark at a Cabinet meeting yesterday for the benefit of the Communist members of the Govt who had been visibly "shocked" to learn that the Soviet Govt did not regard itself as omnipotent.

At the close of his remarks Beneš referred to the fact that the Soviets had "received all of the credit" in Czechoslovakia for the Potsdam decision authorizing the transfer of the German minority to Germany and expressed the hope that if a favorable decision is arrived at in Paris authorizing the transfer of the Hungarian minority to Hungary, the decision would be conveyed to him immediately "so that this time the US will at least share in the credit."

Sent Paris 107, repeated Dept 727.

Steinhardt

*FRUS, 1946, 6, pp. 368-69. Cf. Box 96, RG-43, N.A.

MR. BONBRIGHT

DOCUMENT NO. 25**PARIS CONFERENCE***

Paris, France

UNITED STATES DELEGATION

August 27, 1946

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Szegedy-Maszak, Hungarian Minister in Washington
Mr. F. T. Merrill

Mr. Szegedy-Maszak called this noon at his request and inquired whether the U.S. Delegation had been informed that the Yugoslavs had submitted two amendments to the Political and Territorial Commission for Hungary: (a) an exchange of populations between Yugoslavia and Hungary; and (b) regarding certain waterway rights. He appeared to be considerably agitated and expressed alarm over the "closing pincers of the reviving Little Entente against Hungary engulfed as it is in a sea of Slav people." He said that the Hungarians were fast coming to the conclusion that they were now "the most unfavored nation" and that the new proposals being made to rob Hungary of its sovereignty, particularly in matters of communications, confirmed his opinion that the time was approaching when it would have by necessity to accept its place in the Soviet sphere.

The exchange of populations proposal of the Yugoslavs had come as a complete surprise to the Hungarians, who had had no indication previously that the Yugoslavs thought it necessary to

raise the minorities issue. However, Szegedy-Maszak admitted that the Yugoslav proposal on the minorities was less important than their second proposal which was to the effect that Hungary should surrender certain rights in connection with the Danube and the Tisza rivers. He believed that Yugoslavia is now the spearhead of Soviet policies regarding the Danube and that this proposal is part of the larger picture.

He said that the arrival of Gero in Paris to be a member of the Hungarian Delegation was exceedingly ominous. Auer, the Hungarian Minister here, had asked the Prime Minister to replace Bolgar, the original nominee, as Deputy Chief of the Delegation in order that the Communist Party might participate in and accept responsibility for the Peace Treaty. (I don't believe that they bargained on getting the most brilliant and dangerous Communist of them all.)

Gero is the Minister of Communications, was trained in Moscow and at one time apparently occupied an important job in Soviet communications. It will be remembered that it was Gero who signed the collaboration agreement between the USSR and Hungary last August in Moscow without the authority of the Cabinet or the knowledge of Miklos, the Prime Minister. Szegedy-Maszak thought that when Bolgar had fallen ill, Rakosi had decided to send Gero, who apparently has many connections with members of the "Soviet bloc" delegations. Szegedy-Maszak now is apprehensive that Gero will negotiate with the Yugoslavs in Paris unbeknownst to the rest of the Delegation and may sign away Hungary's water rights. He had already had several conversations with members of the Yugoslav Delegation. At this juncture Szegedy-Maszak pointed out that virtually the only bargaining point that Hungary now had outside of the "bridgehead" was its situation as "the turn-table" of Europe and that the Hungarian communications system, both rail and water, was the key to the economic federation of the Danubian states. It was this that the Soviet bloc was really after. Szegedy-Maszak said that he felt the Hungarians must hang on to this asset at any cost and certainly not to toss it away to the Yugoslavs.

*Box 97, RG-43, N.A.

859.Konf.1946.

Translation from Hungarian

DOCUMENT NO. 26**MEMORANDUM**

concerning the conversation between Envoy István Kertész and General Pope of Canada.

On September fifteenth the representative of the Canadian delegation in the Hungarian Committee, General Pope, invited me to have lunch with him in his room at the Hotel Crillon with the obvious purpose to discuss with me the controversial Hungaro-Czechoslovak questions.

After the usual courteous conversation, General Pope expressed with military frankness his opinion concerning the Hungaro-Czechoslovak dispute, especially regarding the Czechoslovak plan to expel the Hungarians. His view can be summed up as follows:

Personally he sympathized rather more with the Czechoslovaks, because Hungary belonged during both world wars to the camp of Canada's enemies, while Czechoslovakia was fighting with Canada during these most difficult times. Furthermore, ever since 1938, he, personally, as well as the Canadian people, was ashamed because of the events of Munich. All these circumstances add up to the fact that Canadians sympathize with Czechoslovakia much more than with Hungary. They understand that the Czechoslovaks finally want to have peace in their own country and with their neighbors. It is regrettable that according to the opinion of the Czechoslovaks, such peace can be achieved only through a forced transfer, but the Czechoslovaks cannot be condemned for this attitude in view of their experiences. It is a well-known fact that during the period between the two world wars the Hungarians living in Slovakia and the Hungarian government did everything to promote anti-Czechoslovak propaganda. Considering all these circumstances, only the Puritan conscience and conviction of the Canadians hinder them from voting for the Czechoslovak proposal concerning forceful transfer of the Hungarians. And the Canadians can maintain this attitude only if the Hungarian delegation makes

concessions. Although the Czechoslovaks will have to make concessions too, the Hungarians will have to make considerably greater ones. In this way an agreement can be reached, and it might not be necessary to vote on the question of expulsion. Canada would much prefer this solution.

General Pope expressed the above summarized views in the course of an animated conversation. I told him that although Hungary had been dismembered in 1919 on the basis of the principle of nationality and the right to self-determination, the Hungarian population was nowhere asked whether it wanted to be detached from Hungary. Nearly one million Hungarians lived on territories which had been annexed to Czechoslovakia under various pretexts such as transportation, or strategic and economic necessity. It was quite natural that the Hungarian people was not pleased that by dismemberment of Hungary nearly one-third of all Hungarians had been separated from their mother country. The first World War produced tens of thousand of Hungarian refugees, more than 350,000. The natural dissatisfaction of these refugees as well as oppression of Hungarians in neighboring countries developed a revisionist spirit, which was used by reactionary governments for consolidation of their power.

I told General Pope that in 1919 General Smuts had agreed with Masaryk that the Csallóköz, inhabited entirely by Hungarians, should remain within Hungary, and that in return, Czechoslovakia would get a bridgehead opposite Bratislava on the right bank of the Danube. The Czechoslovak delegation at the Peace Conference disregarded this agreement and in the end Czechoslovakia obtained both the Csallóköz and the bridgehead.

The fate of the Hungarian minorities was relatively best in Czechoslovakia. The Hungarians had grievances but they did not suffer an oppression as harsh as that of the Hungarians in Yugoslavia and in Rumania. In connection with this situation, a substantial part of the Hungarians were satisfied in Czechoslovakia, which secured their living conditions in a democracy. This development explains the fact that in the period which preceded Munich, there was complete tranquility in the Hungarian regions of Czechoslovakia. I brought up several examples. It was understandable, however, that the Hungarians wished to return to Hungary, when they saw the disintegration of Czechoslovakia after Munich, when the Slovaks demanded their independence, and Poland acquired Czechoslovak

territory inhabited by Poles. This was a self-evident phenomenon for which the Hungarians were not to be blamed in the past and should not to be blamed at the present. It seems especially unfair if the Great Powers would punish Hungary and the Hungarians of Slovakia in order to comfort their consciences because of Munich.

A further part of our discussion consisted of the comparison of data. Here I pointed out to General Pope that in spite of our war losses and the extermination of a large number of Jews, we cannot settle in Hungary the Hungarians from Slovakia who are mostly farmers because no land is available.

My arguments did not seem to convince completely General Pope; at best they disturbed his belief in certain Czechoslovak assertions. He told me frankly that he had been a long-time friend of several Czechoslovak delegates.

There is no doubt that my interlocutor is a man of good faith and good will who desires a Hungaro-Czechoslovak rapprochement.

DOCUMENT NO. 27

(INDEX NO. 6)

TELEGRAM SENT*

TO: SECSTATE
WASHINGTON
CODE: CLEAR

DATE: September 21, 1946
NO: 4752
CHARGED TO: Allotment H-21

Yugoslav Delegation yesterday withdrew its amendment to draft treaty with Hungary which proposed exchange of populations with Hungary as an annex. Hungarian Legation Paris has issued following statement. (Odsic 175 to Dept; rpt to Budapest as 128) QUOTE Pursuant to Yugoslav wish to come to agreement with Hungary regarding means of carrying out an exchange of minority populations, conversations have been carried out between Hungarian and Yugoslav Delegations. During these conversations the Hungarian Delegation set forth its point of view in a written document. The Yugoslav Delegation accepted the Hungarian proposal as its own, thereby emphasizing its principle objective was to work for rapprochement of the two people. According to terms of agreement, 40,000 Hungarians and similar number of Yugoslavs will be exchanged, it being understood that on both sides of the frontier full liberty of decision of interested persons will be respected. Execution of the agreement will begin one year after signature and is to be completed during three following years. Persons affected will be authorized to take their movable property and will be indemnified by their respective states for their immovable property. An official communique concerning the agreement will be made public shortly. UNQUOTE

CAFFERY

USDel:FMerrill:fg-ss

860. Konf. 1946.

Translation from Hungarian

DOCUMENT NO. 28**REPORT**

Conversation between István Kertész, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary, and the delegate of New Zealand, Mr. Costello, on September 29, 1946.

Today as I was about to take my lunch in Hotel Claridge, the reporter of the Hungarian Subcommittee, Mr. Costello, delegate of New Zealand, asked me to lunch with him at a separate table, indicating that he had important communications to make.

Mr. Costello started our conversation by telling me that his government had instructed him to vote in favor of the Czechoslovak proposal concerning the transfer of 200,000 Hungarians. He explained that the reason of this decision was the sympathy which the government of New Zealand felt toward Czechoslovakia. He also informed me that in the Hungarian Committee Great Britain, the United States, Australia, and the South African Union would vote against the Czechoslovak proposal. The attitude of Canada is yet undecided. The delegate of India will most probably abstain from voting. Since Nehru is Clementis' good friend, the Indian delegation will certainly not oppose the Czechoslovak proposal. The five Slav states, New Zealand, and France will vote in favor of the Czech proposal. And, if Canada and India decide to join them, a majority of two-thirds will be possible. He asked me to accept the Czechoslovak proposal through a compromise. On his part he would not find it burdensome if the transfer of 200,000 people would take place during ten years, with a yearly contingent of 20,000. But in his opinion the number might be reduced.

I told Mr. Costello, that for us the forced transfer is unacceptable under any conditions. This position is a matter of principle. We cannot make concessions even if the Czechoslovaks would designate a very low number of Hungarians to be transferred. I referred to our arguments of principle and to the practical impossibility of the execution of the transfer. Mr. Costello recognized that one

cannot put farmers from Csallóköz in the place of the Jewish merchants and intellectuals of Budapest or the countryside. He did not seem to believe, however, that we have already distributed all the land of the Germans who left Hungary. He referred to the Czechoslovak assertion that we paid lip service to the agrarian reform. I explained the far-reaching provisions and radical execution of the land reform and pointed out that we still had several hundreds of thousands of people who claimed land.

After a lengthy debate over the arguments for and against the forced transfer, he asked me what we would do if the Conference voted in favor of the Czech proposal. I told Mr. Costello that in this case we probably would return home in a demonstrative way and would await further developments. When he replied that in this case we would make impossible the humane execution of the transfer, I told him that the transfer proposed by the Czechoslovaks could not be executed in a humane form. A humane transfer does not consist only of trains and heated railroad cars. We could not secure a livelihood for the tens of thousands of Hungarian peasant families. Execution of this plan would have such a catastrophic effect on the present Hungarian regime that it would collapse. It seemed to us that the Czechoslovaks did not have any interest in the stabilization of Hungarian democracy. Otherwise, they would not force such a monstrous plan.

The delegate of New Zealand expressed his fear that in case of our refusal the whole Hungarian population of Slovakia might be transferred to some remote parts of Soviet Russia. I flatly refused to entertain this possibility. We discussed several other questions concerning Hungaro-Czechoslovak relations, and some basic difficulties of the Hungarian government. Mr. Costello was depressed by our conversation, and emphasized several times, especially in parting, how "frightfully sorry" he was because of its negative result.

(signed) István Kertész