Introduction

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In September of 1983, the distinguished scholar and diplomat Professor Stephen Kertesz delivered a series of three lectures in Thomas Jefferson's Rotunda at the University of Virginia. The lectures as revised and the supporting documents which illustrate important policies and events make up the present volume. It contains source materials not previously released.

The University of Notre Dame Press recently published Professor Kertesz's *Between Russia and the West—Hungary and the Illusions of Peacemaking, 1945-1947.* The two volumes are complementary. They are companion studies by the Secretary General of the Hungarian Peace Delegation who refused to return to Budapest as designated foreign minister from his post in Rome at the beginning of the Communist takeover. Professor Kertesz went on to Yale University and then to the University of Notre Dame where he brought the Committee on International Relations worldwide distinction. Under his leadership, the Committee published more than sixty monographs and studies. Since then he has continued to write and publish and serve as an advisor to foundations and public agencies in the United States and Europe.

As Professor Kertesz noted, Stalin's statements concerning the new order to be established in countries occupied by the Red Army pinpointed the conflict of values between Soviet and Western approaches to the peace settlement. In the war against Napoleon, Russian troops had marched across Europe. The Tsar led Russian soldiers into Paris itself. At the Congress of Vienna, Russian ambitions for expansion were realized in the annexation of Polish territories. Having satisfied itself through the partition of Poland,

the Tsarist army withdrew from other European countries. In 1945, some observers hoped that the Russians would once more show restraint. However Stalin had other plans and in April of 1945 he told Milovan Djilas: "This war is not as in the past; whoever occupies a territory also imposes on it his own social system. Everyone imposes his own system as far as his army can reach. It cannot be otherwise." (Milovan Djilas, *Conversations with Stalin,* New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1962, p. 114) After the epic struggle of the Red Army and given the mission of communism, Stalin envisioned the spread of Soviet authority throughout Eastern Europe. These issues came to a head in Paris in 1946.

In the core chapters of the book, Professor Kertesz opens the discussion by reviewing various peace plans put forward in what he describes as "the fog of war." Next he analyzes the patterns of peacemaking which were used in postwar conferences. Finally, he examines in chapter three the tragic fate of ex-enemy states as their interests were bargained away by others at the peace table.

The three core chapters gain added substance through the documents Kertesz includes in the study. Part I parallels and supports the first chapter on peace plans. It consists mainly of wartime statements and declarations. What emerges from these documents is the belief of President Roosevelt and some leaders in the Department of State as late as the final months of the war that a general peace conference would be held to prepare the peace treaties and a postwar settlement based on the Atlantic Charter.

Part II brings together documents which illustrate the diplomatic and political problems which arose at the Potsdam and Moscow Conferences. Kertesz gives special attention in the documents he selects to the complications caused by the exclusion of French diplomats from these conferences with their special ties to and competence on Central and Eastern Europe.

Part III is divided into three sections. Section A contains two Hungarian peace preparatory notes which proposed the creation of a cooperative state system along the Danube and preservation of the international character of the Danube River. Cavendish Cannon quoted a passage from the Danube note when the Hungarian delegation supported the Soviet dictated new Danubian convention at the Belgrade Conference in 1948. Harriman's and Schoenfeld's reports throw light on American, British and Soviet policies in Hungary.

The documents in Section B reveal the duplicity of Soviet foreign policy during the Hungarian government delegation's visit in Moscow. The pertinent secret documents, Nos. 17 and 18, are released for the first time at Professor Kertesz's initiative.

Section C combines materials concerning the Hungaro-Czechoslovak conflict and other clashes at the Paris Peace Conference. The Soviet aim was to recast the armistice agreements into peace treaties and this is what happened at the peace table. Yet for Hungary the major problem at Paris was a Czechoslovak proposal to expel 200,000 Hungarians from Slovakia. This proposed amendment to the treaty was part of a Czechoslovak policy to get rid of all non-Slavic populations. Kertesz discovered at the Quai d'Orsay a report from Prague (Document No. 20) which revealed that Deputy Foreign Minister Clementis had been convinced in August 1945 that the Hungarians from Slovakia could be transferred quickly to Hungary on the basis of an agreement with Soviet authorities in Budapest. This procedure proved not feasible and the Soviet delegation in a surprise move proposed at the Potsdam Conference the expulsion of Germans from Hungary. Henceforth the Soviet and Czechoslovak representatives argued that the Germans deported from Hungary should be replaced by Hungarians to be transferred from Slovakia.

After the First World War, Czechoslovakia acquired large territories inhabited by Germans and Hungarians. In 1945 Prague wanted to expel all non-Slavic populations. The Potsdam Conference decided to transfer the Germans from Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary to Germany. Subsequently, the Hungarian government was forced to conclude a population exchange agreement with unilateral benefits for Czechoslovakia. In Paris the Czechoslovak delegation proposed an amendment to the peace treaty for the expulsion of 200,000 Hungarians from Slovakia. It became the major task of Kertesz and his colleagues at Paris to defeat the Czechoslovak amendment. Documents Nos. 26 and 28 are reports of Kertesz's conversations with General Pope of Canada and P. Costello from New Zealand. They illustrate the pro-Czechoslovak feelings of many of the conference participants. Document 29 is a review by the late Philip E. Mosely of volumes published by the Hungarian Ministry for Foreign Affairs on Hungary and the Conference of Paris.

Thanks primarily to American support of the Hungarian position,

the conference rejected the Czechoslovak amendment. Kertesz's article (the last item in the book) on "The Expulsion of the Germans from Hungary" is the only scholarly source of a dismal chapter of postwar diplomacy concerning the interaction of Soviet and Western representatives and an example of the struggle between Communists and Smallholders on foreign policy questions.

The Last European Peace Conference: Paris 1946 is the well-documented story by a participant of an early chapter in the Cold War. It reveals a persistent problem: the lack of consensus and common values between East and West. The Paris Conference was the first public confrontation between the wartime allies. Kertesz who was to become a leading intellectual figure in international relations in the United States retained a calm detachment then and has continued to held such a view into the 1980s. It is appropriate that we begin consideration of consensus and policy with this case study in relations between the Soviet Union and the West.